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UTILITY FUNCTIONS AND FISCAL ILLUSION FROM GRANTS*** 
J. PATRICK O'BRIEN* AND YEUNG-NAN SHIEH** 
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' 1. Introduction 
' THE theory of fiscal illusion from 
· grants-in-aid evolved as an explana­
. tion to resolve an apparent conflict be­
. tween microeconomic theory and empiri
cal results in the area of local public 
fll)ance. Specifically, receipt of lump-sum 
grants by a recipient government has been 
found to lead to in creases in public ex­
penditures by a greater amount than what 
wquld be expected given 1¥1 equivalent 
increase in the community's income.1 Ini
tial inquiries into this phenomenon, in­
voking the notion of fiscal illusion on the 
part of voters/consumers, dealt strictly 
with the impact of unconditional grants 
on the behavior of recipient governmen ts
[Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979), 
Oates (1979), and Winer (1983)]. Hewitt
(1986) and Logan (1986) later extended 
the fiscal illusion model to the grantor 
government. They argued that grants 
cause not only a decrease in the perceived 
price of recipient government services, but 
also an increase in the perceived price of
nonaid federal government services. 
Given a general utility function, a pub­
	 lie choice model, and the assumption that 
voters/consumers base their desired de­
mand for public services on average tax 
prices, Hewitt (1986) explains by way of
Proposition 1, as stated below, the exist­
ing empirical evidence with regard to the 
demand for services provided by a recip­
ient government . 
Proposition 1 .. The representative consumer/voter has 
a demund depided by·o ; a tax price oft, and t here­
fore desires LPG'. With the introduction of grants, the 
person's perceived tax price fulls to i, and therefore 
the person desires LPG*, which represents u move
ment along the demand curve. Hewi tt (1986, pp. 473­
474}. 
From Proposition 1 Hewitt formulates 
Hypothesis I. 
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Hypothesis I: the receipt of intergovernmental grants 
(of any ki nd) will increase the demand for the ser­
vices of" governmental unit. Hewitt (1986, p. 474 ) . 
On the other hand, the effect of grants 
on the demand for services provided by the 
grantor government is characterized by 
Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. If there are no grants, the typic-.tl con
~umcrfvoter will desire fPG '; with the introduction 
of grants the person will move up her demo.nd curve 
aDd desire FPC*. Hewitt (1986, pp. 474-475). 
From Proposition 2 we have the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis D: when a government llnit increa8Ct! its 
level uf intergovernmental grant disbU!Ilemenls, the 
demand for its services falls. Hewitt (1986, p. 475j." 
Hypothesis I is well-known, and is the 
stuff of Courant et al. (1979), Gramlich 
(1977), Oates (1979), and Winer (1983). 
Hypothesis II is of a later vintage and is 
supported by the evidence presented in 
Logan (1986) and Hewitt (1986). 
Propositions 1 and 2, however, apply 
only under conditions more restrictive than 
those specified by Hewitt. Furthermore, 
unless those conditions are sati sfied, Hy
potheses I and II cannot easily be deduced 
from these propositions. 
The purpose of this paper is to r eex
amine the impact of grants on the de­
mands for recipient and nonaid federal 
government services in a model more 
general than that used by Hewitt. It will 
be shown that in the presence of fiscal il
lusion the introduction of grants shifts the 
demands for recipient and nonaid federal 
government services as hypothesized by 
Hewitt if voters/consumers' utility func­
tions are of the Cobb-Douglas type. How­
ever , if utility functions are of the Stone
Geary type, theory does not tell us whether 
the demands for recipient and federal 
government services should respond as 
hypothesized by Hewitt. 3 
2. The Model 
For purposes of this analysis we have 
simplified Hewitt's model by making the 
­
­
­
­
­
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following assumptions. We assume all 
consumers/voters' r esponses are qualita­
tively in the same direction; therefore, a 
model with a typical consumer/voter cap­
tures the basic results of interest. We as­
sume also that nonaid federal govern­
ment services and recipient government 
services are normal goods. This assump­
tion is supported by existing empirical 
evidence, e.g., Fisher (1988, pp. 284- 295). 
Additionally, we assume a unitary per unit 
price for both recipient government ser­
vices and nonaid federal government ser­
vices.4 Following Logan (1986, p. 1312) and 
McGuire (1979, p. 44), we utilize a Stone­
Geary type utility function, whereby the 
illusory model can be specified as: 
max U = buln(Yd- -y0) + btln(LPG - "fl) 
+ b2ln(FGP - 'Y2) (1) 
subject toY= Yd + t ,LPG + {rFGP (2) 
where LPG = recipient government ser­
vices, FGP == nonaid federal government 
services, i., = perceived consum~r/ voter 
recipient government tax share, tr = per­
ceived consumer /voter federal govern­
ment tax share, Y = real gross income, 
and Yd = real private exp~nditures on
market goods. Furthermore, tc = (LPG ­
G.)t,/LPG, and 4 = <FGP + G)tr/FGP, 
where tc = actual consumer/voter recip­
ient government tax share, tf = actual
consumer/voter federal government tax
share, G" = grant aid from federal gov­
ernment to recipient government, and G 
= total grant aid to all recipient govern­
ments. The b; and 'Y; (i = 0, 1, 2) are pa­
rameters with ho + b1 + b2 = 1.5 For sim­
plicity, we abstract from income transfers
such that t.,G. = t,G. 6 A key feature of this
model is that federal government grants
result in both a decrease in the perceived
price of recipient government services and
an increase in the perceived price of non­
aid federal government services. 
Applying the Lagrange method to
equations (1) and (2) and utilizing the re­
sulting first-order conditions to solve for
optimal quantities, we obtain the demand
functions for private goods, recipient gov­
ernment services and nonaid federal gov­
ernment services as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yd = (1 - b.h. + b.(Y - -y,t.- 'Y2tr) (3) 
LPG = (1 - b,)-yt + (b1/fJ 
· (Y - 'Yo - 'Y2fr) (4) 
FGP = (1 - b2)-yz 
+ O>:dtrXY - -y. - -y,t.> (5) 
Differentiating (4) and (5), we obtain the 
effects of grants on the demands for re­
cipient government services and nonaid 
federal government services as; , 
ilLPG/aG = -(bl"/2/tr.)(ilf.t,/aG) 
- bl(l/t.)2(Y - 'Yo - 'Y2irxat.,;am (6) 
r1FGP/aG = - (1>:!-yifi.r)(ilt./ilG) 
2
- b2(1/ tr) (Y - -y.. - 'Yttd(ili,/iJG) (7) 
where (ili.,/ iJG) < 0 and (iltr/ilG) > 0 . Since 
i., = (LPG - G.)te/LPG, an increase in G 
results in a decrease in the perceived tax 
price of recipient government spending. .
With additional aid a recipient govern· 
ment can increase services provided with­
out levying additional taxes. If voters are 
unaware of the aid received, they per­
ceive a reduction in the tax price of re­
cipient government spending. Moreover,.
they perceive a rise in the tax price of 
grantor government nonaid services if the 
grantor government funds aid by r educ• 
ing nonaid services or raising taxes. The 
tiret term on the right hand side of equa­
tions (6) and (7) is the cross-substitution 
effect, and the second term is the own price 
effect. 
From (6), for example, we fmd that as 
G increases, the perceived tax price of re-; 
cipi ent government services decreases, 
leading to an increase in the demand for, 
local government services. This is the im­
pact of the own price effect on the deman4' 
for recipient government services. On the 
other hand, the perceived tax price of 
grantor government nonaid services rises[ 
The consumer/voter perceives, therefore, 
a drop in his real income, which has a del­
pressing effect on the demand for recipi­
ent government services. In that the·signs 
of the cross-substitution and own price et,: 
fects are different, the signs of ilLPG/CIG 
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and rJFGP/ iJG can not be determined a 
priori. 
From (6), however, we can conclude that 
PropositJO~ l ' : an iJ?crease in federal government 
grant~~, which raiseA 1(, will CQW\e the demand curve 
for rectpt~nt governme_nt sorvices to shilt in. On the 
other lwnd, it roducus t., which causes an increru;e in 
the amount or recipient government services de­
manded. 
This result is quite different and more 
~ene:al than Hewitt's Proposition 1. It also 
•mphes that the derivation of Hypothesis 
I, as stated by Hewitt, requires an addi­
tiOnal assumption a bout t he relative 
st:en~hs of the own price and cross-sub­
~titutiOn ~ffects associated with a change 
'~ G. ObviOusly, Hewitt neglected to con­
Sider the cross-substitution effect. 
From (7), we can conclude that 
Propositio~ 2': an in~rease in f~'<l eral go,•ernment 
grants, ":hich "'duces t.. will cause the demand CUl'Yc 
for nona1d federal govemmcot services to ahift t 
On the. other hand, it rais.,; f,, which causes 8 °dc: ~ Ul the amount of nooaid federal goveromomt 
seTVJce.o demanded. 
Aga~, this result is quite different from 
Hewttt's Proposition 2. 
Proposi t ion 1' can be depicted more 
clearly with the aid of Figure 1 which il­
lustrates the effects of grants on the de­
m~~d for recipient gove rnment services. 
Imti~ly we assume the own price effect 
do~unate~ the cr oss-substitution effect. 
W1th the mtroduction of grants, the con­
sumer/voter's perceived price of nonaid 
federal government services intreases to 
tr and the demand curve for recipient gov­
ernment services shifts inward to D*. On 
th~ other.hand, the consumer/voter's per­
c~Ived.pnce of recipient government ser­
Ylces falls which represen ts a movement 
along demand curve D*. The net effect is 
for ~he amount of recipient govemment 
~rv1ces demanded to increase. However 
if the croaa-substitution effect dominate~ 
the own price effect, LPG* would lie to the 
left of LPG'. 
A similar figure .could be shown to il­
lustrate the effects of grants on the de­
~and for ~onaid federal government ser­
vices. Agam, we could assume the own 
effect dominates the cross-substitu­
effect. With the introduction of iz.ants, 
consumel'/voter's perceived price of 
JOURNAL [Vol. XLIII No. 2J FISCAL ILLUSION 203 
= (1 - b0)"'/0 + b0(Y - "'/lfc - 'Y2it) (3) 
'G = (1 - b1h1 + (b1/tcl 
(Y - 'Yo - 'Yztr) (4) 
fP = (1 - b2)-y~ 
(5) 
fferentiating (4) and (5), we obtain the 
'ects of grants on the demands for rc­
)ient government services and nonaid 
leral government services as: 
,PGjaG = -(bl-y2ftc)(atrfaG) 
-b1(1/tY(Y- 'Yo --y2trHatjaG) (6) 
'GPI aG = -~b2'Y 1 /t.)(atc/aGl 
-b2(1/tr)2(Y - )'0 - 'Yltc)(Jtr/iJG) (7) 
1ere (iJtjaG) < 0 and (ofr/r1G) > 0. Since 
= (LPG - Gcltc/LPG, an increase in G 
sults in a decrease in the perceived tax 
ice of recipient government spending. 
ith additional aid a recipient govern­
ent can increase services provided with­
Lt levying additional taxes. If voters are 
1aware of the aid received, they per­
ive a reduction in the tax price of re­
pient government spending. Moreover, 
.ey perceive a rise in the tax price of 
·antor government nonaid services if the 
·antor government funds aid by reduc­
g nonaid services or raising taxes. The 
rst term on the right hand side of equa­
ons (6) and (7) is the cross-substitution 
feet, and the second term l.s the own price 
feet. 
From (6), for example, we find that as 
increases, the perceived tax price of re­
pient government services decreases, 
ading to an increase in the demand for 
·cal government services. This is the im­
lct of the own price effect on the demand 
•r recipient government services. On the 
;her hand, the perceived tax price of 
rantor government nonaid services rises. 
he consumer/voter perceives, therefore, 
drop in his real income, which has a de­
ressing effect on the demand for recipi­
:J.t government services. In that the signs 
f the cross-substitution and own price ef­
~cts are different, the signs of aLPG/aG 
and aFGPjaG can not be determined a
priori. 
From (6), however, we can conclude that
Proposition 1': an increase in federal government
grants, which raises t , 1 will cause the demand curve 
for recipient government services to shift in.. On the 
other hand, it reduces t~, which causes an increase in 
the amount of recipient government scrvice!ii de­
manded. 
This result is quite different and more
general than Hewitt's Proposition 1. It also
implies that the derivation of Hypothesis
I, as stated by Hewitt, requires an addi­
tional assumption about the relative
strengths of the own price and cross-sub­
stitution effects associated with a change 
in G. Obviously, Hewitt neglected to con­
sider the cross-substitution effect. 
From (7), we can conclude that 
Proposition 2 ': an in~reasc in federal government 
grants, which reduces t_, will cause the demand curve 
for nonaid federal government services to shift out. 
On the other hand, it raises i,, which causes a de­
crea•e in the amount of nonaid federal government 
services demanded. 
Again, this result is quite different from 
Hewitt's Proposition 2. 
Proposition 1 ' can be depicted more 
clearly with the aid of Figure 1 which il­
lustrates the effects of grants on the de­
mand for recipient government services. 
Initially we assume the own price effect 
dominates the cross-substitution effect. 
With the introduction of grants, the con­
sumer/voter's perceived price of nonaid 
federal government services increases to 
tr and the demand curve for recipient gov­
ernment services shifts inward to D*. On 
the other hand, the consumer/voter's per­
ceived price of recipient government ser­
vices falls which represents a movement 
along demand curve D*. The net effect is 
for the amount of recipient government 
services demanded to increase. However, 
if the cross-substitution effect dominates 
the own price effect, LPG* would lie to the 
left of LPG'. 
A similar figure could be shown to il­
lustrate the effects of grants on the de­
mand for nonaid federal government ser­
vices. Again, we could assume the own 
price effect dominates the cross-substitu­
tion effect. With the introduction of grants, 
the consumer/voter's perceived price of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
recipient government services falls and the 
demand curve for nonaid federal govern­
ment services shifts outward. On the other 
hand, the consumer/voter's perceived price 
of nonaid federal government services rises 
which represents a movement along the 
new higher demand. The net effect is that 
the amount of grantor government non­
aid services demanded decreases. As in the 
case with the demand for recipient gov­
ernment services, however, it is impor­
tant.to note that this predicted change is 
predwated upon the dominance of the own 
price effect over the cross-substitution ef­
fect. 
Finally, for the case in which 'Yo = -y = 1 
'Y2 = 0, the demand functions for private 
goods, recipient government services and 
nonaid federal government services would 
be 
(3') 
LPG= (bdtJY (4') 
(5') 
In this case, the demands for recipient 
government services and nonaid federal 
government services depend only on their 
own prices. 
Therefore, for Hypotheses I and II to flow 
logically from Propositions 1' and 2', we 
must assume either that voters/con­
sumers' utility functions are of the Cobb­
Douglas type or that the own price effect 
of grants dominates the cross-substitu­
tion effect. 
3. Conclusions 
Ten years ago, Oates pointed out an ap­
parent asymmetry between lump-sum 
grants and increases in private income. 
He stated that "Increases in income shift 
the demand curve outward . . . , while 
grants lower the price to the taxpayer­
voter and produce a downward movement 
along his demand curve" (1979, p. 28). He 
further noted that 
''increases in personal incomes t o the members of a 
community are not equivalent, in terms of their bud­
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XLIII 
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"see for instance Henderson and Quandt (1980 
88). 'J 
' tn g"neral, for an individual consumer/voter t,C 
~ I,G(l + a), where n is greater t han, less than c 
equ.nl to zero. In the aggregate, however a must b 
equal to tero. ' 
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get.ary effects, to an equal increase in lwnp-sum in­
tergoVCl'lllllenlal revenues because, although they may 
generate the same true budget constr-aint, they do not 
result in the !lliiile perc~wed budget constraint" (1979, 
p. 29). 
This important proposition was based on 
a partial equilibrium model in which the 
fiscal illusion associated with federal gov­
ernment spending is ignored. Recently, 
Hewitt found that in a dual illusion model 
Oates' proposition that grants lower the 
price to the taxpayer-voter and produce a 
downward movement along his demand 
curve can be applied to both demands for 
recipient government goods and federal 
government goods. 
In this paper, we show that in a dual 
illusion model the impact of grants on the 
demands for recipient government ser­
vices and nonaid federal goverment ser­
vices reflect two effects: (1) Grants change 
the perceived price of public goods and 
produce a movement along the demand 
curve; (2) Grants change the perceived 
price of r ecipient government services 
(nonaid federal government services) and 
shift the demand curve for nonaid federal 
government services (recipient govern­
ment services). These results are quite 
different from Hewitt's findings. We fur~ 
ther show that t he second effect, i.e., the 
cross-substitution effect, disappears if the 
utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas 
type. This indicates that Hewitt's results 
apply only as a special case. · 
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